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Moral investing: Psychological motivations and implications
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Abstract
In four experiments we showed that investors are not only interested in maximizing returns but have non-financial goals,
too. We considered what drives the decision to invest ethically and the impact this strategy has on people’s evaluation of
investment performance. In Study 1, participants who chose a moral portfolio (over an immoral one) reported being
less interested in maximizing their gains and more interested in being true to their moral values. These participants
also reported feeling lower disappointment upon learning that a different decision could have yield a better outcome. In
Studies 2 and 3, we replicated these findings when investors decided not to invest in immoral assets, rather than when
they choose to invest morally. In Study 4, we found similar results using the same industrial sector in both the moral and
the immoral conditions and providing participants with information about the expected return of the portfolio they were
presented with. These findings lend empirical support to the conclusion that investors have both utilitarian (financial) goals
and expressive (non-financial) ones and show how non-financial motivations can influence the reaction to unsatisfactory
investment performance.
Keywords: ethical behavior, behavioral finance, choice, emotion.
1 Introduction
Despite doubts about the real advantage of following a
socially responsible strategy (Bello, 2005; Diltz, 1995;
Grossman & Sharpe, 1986; Kempf & Osthoff, 2007; Stat-
man, 2007), more and more funds are now available that
use moral criteria to screen stocks. For instance, between
1995 and 2012 in the United States, the number of so-
cially screened funds increased from 55 to 720, while in
the last two years, socially responsible investments (SRI)
assets rose 78 percent, from $569 billion to $1,013 billion.
This increase far exceeded that obtained by the broader
universe of assets under professional management in the
same period (US Social Investment Forum, 2012).
One of the key goals of SRI is to make money while
also doing good. Consistently, a possible psychological
(aka non-financial) advantage of investing morally is to
help in coping with possible downturns and negative per-
formances. In other words, being true to one’s moral val-
ues and the associated positive feeling of helping the com-
munity, the environment, some minority groups, or other
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valuable aims should help the investor feel lower disap-
pointment in the face of a financial loss or a missed gain.
Using hypothetical scenarios, the goal of the present paper
was to demonstrate empirically the value of SRI in helping
investors cope with unsatisfactory investment returns. We
also explored the conditions in which this effect is more
likely to happen and expected it to be driven by the fact
that investors are not always motivated by the unique ob-
jective of maximizing their financial gains. We hypothe-
sized that, if an investor is mainly motivated by a financial
goal, she should find it more difficult to accept an unsatis-
factory outcome compared to an investor who has picked
her investments based on multiple criteria, including non-
financial ones (such as being true to her moral values).
Several surveys of investors’ behavior showed that in-
dividual preferences can influence choices and interfere
with a strategy based on merely risk-return computations
(see, Beal, Goyen, & Phillips, 2005; Lease, Lewellen,
& Schlarbaum, 1976; Lewellen, Lease, & Schlarbaum,
1977; Nagy & Obenberger, 1994; Warren, Stevens, & Mc-
Conkey, 1990). Investors’ choices for best of sector “eth-
ical funds”1 seem to support the reasoning that they are
willing to pay higher transaction costs for what is essen-
1Best of sector “ethical funds” are funds that invest on any industrial
sectors but picking only the companies with the best records on the en-
vironment and human rights in each sector. In other words, a best of
sector “ethical fund” can invest on oil companies but it will select only
those with the best socially responsible records. It will not exclude an
entire sector just because its business is judged not socially responsible.
Compared to a mutual fund, best of sector “ethical funds” have higher
transaction costs since they entail additional managing activities related
to the selection of specific companies (the most responsible ones) within
each industrial sector.
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tially the same product as a regular mutual fund simply
to derive a higher benefit from the fact that the fund is
branded as socially responsible. Therefore, people who
are willing to purchase best of sector funds fit the pro-
file of an investor who expects to gain direct utility from
investing ethically, and should be driven by both finan-
cial returns and non-wealth factors (Cullis, Lewis, & Win-
nett, 1992). Similarly, Williams (2007) provided evidence
that a significant portion of investors from five different
countries consider a company’s social and environmental
behavior when making investment decisions. This does
not mean that these investors are extremists and do not
care about the financial performance of their investments
(Sparkes, 2001). A similar conclusion has been proposed
by McLachlan and Gardner (2004), who found that both
socially responsible as well as conventional investors give
the same importance to financial return on investment.
However, socially responsible investors rate twelve out of
twelve ethical issues as more important for their decision
compared with the ratings provided by conventional in-
vestors.
Consistent with the survey data reviewed so far, Stat-
man (2004) suggested that investments provide individ-
uals with two different benefits: utilitarian and expres-
sive. On the one hand, high expected returns and low
risk are the prototypical exemplars of the utilitarian ben-
efits of investments. On the other hand, expressive ben-
efits allow people to express their values, social class,
and lifestyle choices to themselves and to others. We
use the word “utilitarian” in the sense of economic util-
ity (e.g., an investor is utilitarian when she aims at maxi-
mizing her gains), rather than with the meaning the word
has in normative ethical theory (that is, the greatest good
for the greatest number). And we use the term “expres-
sive” (or “moral”) to include benefits for others that result
from the investment as well as emotional benefits from the
investor’s feelings of having financially supported good
things (Beal et al., 2005). The present paper adds to the
literature on SRI by manipulating the type of assets people
invest in and assessing their reactions when the financial
performance is unsatisfactory.
We maintain that, in the financial domain, if a decision
is coded as ethical, then the moral dimension becomes part
of the allocation process and investors are more likely to
report that their decisions are driven by the desire to be
true to their moral values. Consequently, we also hypoth-
esized that when people are driven by a moral motiva-
tion, they should feel lower disappointment when the fi-
nancial results of their investments are unsatisfactory. In
contrast, when people interpret the decision as driven by
financial motivations, the moral dimension should not af-
fect the way they invest their money because the decision
is driven by the desire to maximize their gains. However,
by being focused mainly on the financial, monetary out-
come of their investments, these people must experience
the highest disappointment2 once they learn that a differ-
ent strategy could have yielded a better result. In other
words, they do not have any additional motivation, besides
financial performance, that is strong enough to help them
cope with an unsatisfactory outcome. On this basis, we hy-
pothesized that investors who report being more interested
in being true to their moral values should feel less disap-
pointment than those who report being more interested in
the financial return, when their investments achieve unsat-
isfactory results.
2 Study 1
In Study 1, we asked participants to choose among dif-
ferent investment portfolios, then we measured their self-
reported motivation to either gain money or to be true
to their moral values, and their disappointment once in-
formed that a different decision would have yielded a bet-
ter outcome.
2.1 Method
Participants. One hundred fifty-two people (33% fe-
male; mean age 28 years; SD = 7.29) took part in Study 1.
They were contacted on Amazon’s Mechanical Turk and
paid $0.20. Amazon Mechanical Turk is now commonly
used to recruit adult participants for online studies and
has been validated by Buhrmester, Kwang, and Gosling
(2011), and Paolacci, Chandler, and Ipeirotis (2010). All
participants were from the United States.
Materials and procedure. Participants were presented
with the following scenario:
Imagine you want to invest $10,000 in the stock market.
Among the many different alternatives you have looked at,
you have found the following portfolios. Which portfolio
would you prefer to invest in?
• PORTFOLIO 1: This portfolio is invested in the
stocks of two companies involved with fair trade.
[Moral portfolio]
• PORTFOLIO 2: This portfolio is invested in the
stocks of two companies that belong to the pornog-
raphy sector. [Immoral portfolio]
• PORTFOLIO 3: This portfolio is invested in the stock
of a company that belongs to the pornography sector
and the stock of a company involved with fair trade.
[Mixed portfolio]
2We use the term “disappointment” because that is what we asked
our subjects. Technically, “regret” may be a better term, because we ask
subjects to compare the outcome to that of another option rather than
another state of the world. In Study 4 we ask about both.
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Participants were asked to choose one of the three differ-
ent portfolios. Once participants made their choice, they
were presented with a new screen and asked to report the
main motivation that drove their decisions. Answers were
provided on a 9-point scale, with the two extremes labeled,
respectively: “Being true to my moral values” and “Gain
money.” The midpoint of the scale was labeled “Both mo-
tivations.” No numbers were associated with the points
on the scale (we only used the labels described above);
however, in the analyses we assigned values ranging from
−4, associated with the moral motivation end of the scale,
to +4, associated with the financial motivation end of the
scale. In a subsequent screen, participants were informed
that, by choosing one of the other two portfolios, they
would have gained at least $5,000 more and rated their dis-
appointment on a 6-point scale ranging from 0 (“not dis-
appointed at all”) to 5 (“very disappointed”). Finally, in
an additional screen, we presented a manipulation check
to assess whether fair-trade and pornography were actu-
ally perceived to have a different moral value. Participants
rated how morally acceptable they perceived fair trade and
pornography using two 7-point scales ranging from 1 (“not
moral at all”) to 7 (“very moral”).
2.2 Results
Preliminary analyses and choices. We first looked at
the moral value of the two industrial sectors. The manip-
ulation check confirmed that fair trade (M = 5.46; SD =
1.81) was judged as more morally acceptable than pornog-
raphy (M = 3.91; SD = 2.30), t (151) = 8.97; p < 01.
Looking at choices, about half of all participants chose
to invest in the moral portfolio (49%; N = 75), whereas a
slightly lower number of people chose the mixed portfo-
lio, which was investing in both a moral company and an
immoral company (44%; N = 66). Only a few participants
decided to invest in the immoral portfolio (7%; N = 11).
Nonetheless, we treated choice as an interval scale (1–3).
Finally, motivation and disappointment ratings were posi-
tively correlated, r = .53, p < .01.
Motivation ratings. Participants who chose the moral
portfolio reported lower values on the motivation scale
compared to participants who chose one of the other two
portfolios (ratings ranged between −4 and 4; lower values
corresponded to a higher motivation to be true to one’s
moral values and higher values corresponded to a higher
motivation to gain money). The difference was statisti-
cally significant: Mmoral = .31 (SD = 2.82); Mmixed = 2.47
(SD = 1.60); Mimmoral = 2.64 (SD = 1.57); F (1,150) =
29.47; p < .001.
Disappointment ratings. We ran the same analysis to
assess whether participants who chose to invest morally
felt less disappointment after learning that they would
have been better off making a different choice. Consis-
tent with the results found for the motivation variable, peo-
ple who invested in the moral portfolio reported a signifi-
cantly lower disappointment (scaled 0–5) than those who
invested in the immoral one: Mmoral = 2.56 (SD = 1.80);
Mmixed = 3.29 (SD = 1.47); Mimmoral = 3.36 (SD = 1.12); F
(1,150) = 6.91; p = .009.
2.3 Discussion
Results of Study 1 supported our hypothesis, showing that
when people choose a moral investment they do so be-
cause, besides being interested in gaining money, they are
also interested in being true to their moral values. In-
deed, ratings on the motivation scale showed that partic-
ipants who invested morally were driven by both motiva-
tions (being true to their moral values and gaining money),
whereas participants who invested in the immoral portfo-
lio were mainly interested in the financial outcome of their
investments. Furthermore, consistent with our hypothe-
sis, participants who were less willing to compromise their
moral values felt also less disappointment once informed
that a different choice could have yield a better outcome.
At this point, the reader could be tempted to conclude
that people who invest morally are more influenced by the
moral dimension of their decision and, therefore, feel less
disappointment. However, in Study 1, we compared moral
and immoral portfolios, and that made it impossible to as-
sess if these results depended on participants’ decision to
invest morally or on their decision to avoid the immoral as-
set. To overcome this confounding factor, in Study 2, we
tested two different conditions in which participants were
asked to choose either between moral and neutral portfo-
lios, or immoral and neutral ones.
3 Study 2
Study 2 was designed to overcome the confounding that
arose from the previous study. Participants were assigned
to two different conditions and asked to choose one of
three investment portfolios. In the moral condition, they
were presented with a neutral portfolio, a moral portfolio,
and a mixed portfolio invested in both the neutral and the
moral assets, whereas in the immoral condition, they were
presented with the neutral portfolio, an immoral portfolio,
and a mixed one invested in both the immoral and neu-
tral assets. If being moral is the main drive of the results
found in the previous study, we should replicate the re-
sults only in the moral condition. That is, upon learning
that their investment could have achieved a higher perfor-
mance, participants choosing the moral portfolio should
feel less disappointment than those choosing the neutral
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portfolio since they did so to be true to their moral val-
ues. On the contrary, if avoiding immoral assets is the
main reason why people felt less disappointment in the
face of an unsatisfactory financial outcome, results from
Study 1 should be replicated only in the immoral con-
dition. In this case, upon learning that their investment
could have achieved better results, participants choosing
the neutral portfolio should feel less disappointment than
those choosing the immoral portfolio since they did so to
be true to their moral values.
3.1 Method
Participants. One hundred fifty-eight participants (45%
female; mean age 31 years, SD = 10.81) took part in Study
2. They were contacted on Amazon Mechanical Turk
and paid $0.15 to complete a short questionnaire. Peo-
ple who participated in Study 1 were filtered using Turk-
Gate (Goldin & Darlow, 2013) and could not take part in
Study 2. Participants were randomly assigned to one of
the two experimental conditions: eighty participants com-
pleted the moral condition, whereas seventy-eight com-
pleted the immoral condition.
Materials and procedure. Participants were presented
with the following scenario (wording for the immoral con-
dition is reported in parenthesis):
Imagine you want to invest $10,000 in the stock market.
Among the many different alternatives you have looked at,
you have found the following portfolios. Which portfolio
would you prefer to invest in?
• PORTFOLIO 1: This portfolio is invested in the
stocks of two companies that belong to the airline
sector. [Neutral portfolio]
• PORTFOLIO 2: This portfolio is invested in the
stocks of two companies involved with microcredit
(vivisection). [Moral (Immoral) portfolio]
• PORTFOLIO 3: This portfolio is invested in the stock
of a company involved with microcredit (vivisection)
and the stock of a company that belongs to the airline
sector. [Mixed portfolio]
In both the moral and the immoral conditions, participants
were also presented with a definition of the business sec-
tors composing each portfolio. Therefore, in the moral
condition, we provided a definition of the microcredit sec-
tor, whereas in the immoral condition, we provided a def-
inition of the vivisection sector. In both conditions, par-
ticipants could also read a definition of the neutral asset
(airlines).3
3The definitions of the three industrial sectors were the following: mi-
crocredit: this industrial sector is involved with the act of lending a small
amount of money at low interest to small businesses in the developing
After making their choices, participants were presented
with a screen in which they were asked to rate their mo-
tivation on the same 9-point scale already used in Study
1. Subsequently, in a different screen, they were informed
about the unsatisfactory outcome of their investment and
asked to rate their disappointment on a 6-point scale like
the one used in the previous study. At the end of the study,
we presented a manipulation check screen in which partic-
ipants were asked to rate the moral value of the industrial
sectors with which they were presented. Depending on
the condition, a first question asked to rate the moral value
of microcredit or vivisection, whereas a second question
asked to rate the moral value of the airline sector. Since
we had a neutral asset in addition to the moral and im-
moral ones, this time we used a bipolar scale ranging from
−3 (“very immoral”) to 3 (“very moral”); the midpoint
was labeled “neither moral nor immoral.”
3.2 Results
Preliminary analyses and choices. To check how the
three assets were perceived, we ran a repeated-measures
analysis of variance with asset (moral/immoral vs. neutral)
as within-subject factor, condition (moral vs. immoral) as
between-subject factor, and ratings of moral value as the
dependent variable. Results revealed a significant effect of
asset, F (1, 156) = 58.52; p < .01; η2 = .27, a significant
effect of condition, F (1, 156) = 9.89; p < .01; η2 = .06,
and a significant interaction effect, F (1, 156) = 87.09;
p < .01; η2 = .36. Contrast analyses showed that in the
immoral condition, there was a significant difference in
moral value between vivisection (M = −1.15; SD = 1.58)
and airlines (M = 1.24; SD = 1.43), t (77) = 11.74; p < .01.
In the moral condition, despite being in the right direction,
the difference between airlines (M = .45; SD = 1.15) and
microcredit (M = .69; SD = 1.31) was not significant, t
(79) = 1.22; p = .23. Finally, microcredit was judged sig-
nificantly more moral than vivisection, t (156) = 7.99; p <
.01, whereas airlines was judged significantly more moral
when paired with the immoral sector than with the moral
one, t (156) = 3.86; p < .01.
In the moral condition, 82% (N = 66) of participants
chose a portfolio that was investing in stocks involved with
microcredit (either the moral portfolio or the mixed one),
whereas in the immoral condition, 53% (N = 41) of par-
ticipants chose a portfolio that was investing in stocks in-
volved with vivisection (either the immoral portfolio or the
mixed one). Therefore, significantly more people chose
the moral portfolio in the moral condition than the im-
world; vivisection: this industrial sector is involved with the practice of
performing operations on live animals with the purpose of experimenta-
tion or scientific research; airlines: this industrial sector includes com-
panies that provide air transport services for traveling passengers and
freight.
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Figure 1: Average motivation ratings in Study 2 by con-
dition and investment choice. Lower values indicate a
stronger motivation to be true to ones’ moral values;
higher values indicate a stronger motivation to gain money
(scale ranging from −4 to +4).
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moral portfolio in the immoral condition, χ2 (1, 158) =
16.19; p < .01. Finally, motivation and disappointment
ratings correlated positively, r = .51, p < .01.
Motivation ratings . We investigated motivation ratings
by way of a 2 (condition: moral vs. immoral) x 2 (choice:
moral/immoral portfolios vs. neutral portfolio) analysis of
variance. Results revealed a significant effect of condition,
F (1, 157) = 28.83; p < .01; η2 = .16, and a significant
effect of choice, F (1, 157) = 30.66; p < .01; η2 = .17.
This analysis also showed a significant interaction effect,
F (1, 157) = 50.11; p < .01; η2 = .25 (see Figure 1).
Contrast effects revealed that participants choosing the
neutral portfolio in the immoral condition (M =−2.03; SD
= 2.30) were the most concerned with being true to their
moral values: respectively, t (154) = 10.33; p < .01 for
the comparison with participants who chose a portfolio in-
vested in companies involved with vivisection (M = 2.56;
SD = 1.43); t (154) = 9.86; p < .01 for the comparison
with participants choosing a portfolio invested in compa-
nies involved with microcredit (M = 1.94; SD = 1.81); and
t (154) = 7.37; p < .01 for the comparison with participants
choosing the neutral portfolio in the moral condition (M =
2.50; SD = 2.82).
Disappointment ratings. We investigated participants’
disappointment by way of a 2 (condition: moral vs. im-
moral) x 2 (choice: moral/immoral portfolios vs. neutral
Figure 2: Average disappointment ratings in Study 2 by
condition and investment choice. Higher values indicate
more intense disappointment (scale ranging from 0 to 5).
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portfolio) analysis of variance. Results revealed a signifi-
cant effect of choice, F (1, 157) = 19.00; p < .01; η2 = .11,
and a significant interaction effect, F (1, 157) = 9.68; p <
.01; η2 = .06. The effect of condition was not significant,
F (1, 157) = 1.04; p = .31; η2 < .01 (see Figure 2).
Contrast effects showed that participants choosing the
neutral portfolio in the immoral condition (M = 1.68; SD
= 1.58) were those experiencing the lowest level of disap-
pointment: t (154) = 6.12; p < .01 for the comparison with
participants who chose a portfolio invested in companies
involved with vivisection (M = 3.68; SD = 1.27); t (154)
= 4.87; p < .01 for the comparison with participants who
chose a portfolio invested in companies involved with mi-
crocredit (M = 3.12; SD = 1.40); and t (154) = 2.45; p
< .02 for the comparison with participants who chose the
neutral portfolio in the moral condition (M = 2.79; SD =
1.76).
3.3 Discussion
Study 2 was devised to assess whether people’s higher mo-
tivation to be true to their moral values and lower disap-
pointment depend on their decision to invest in a moral
asset or, rather, on their decision to avoid investing in im-
moral assets. Results showed that participants were signif-
icantly more motivated to behave in accordance with their
moral values when they were choosing the neutral port-
folio over the immoral one than when they were choos-
ing the moral portfolio over the neutral one. Therefore,
we found additional support for our hypothesis that being
true to one’s moral values leads to feel less disappoint-
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ment once an investment achieves and unsatisfactory per-
formance. However, findings from Study 2 suggest that
this is particularly true when people did not invest in an
immoral asset rather than when they decide to invest in a
moral one.
A possible problem with Study 2 is that the neutral port-
folio was judged significantly more moral when it was
paired with the immoral portfolio than when it was paired
with the moral one. However, this result could depend
from the fact that the ratings of moral value were provided
at the end of the study and could have been influenced by
the comparison of the neutral asset with either the moral
or the immoral one.
4 Study 3
In Study 2, participants’ decisions to avoid the immoral
portfolio were associated with a stronger motivation to be
true to their moral values than when they were choosing
to invest in a moral portfolio. However, the presence of a
neutral alternative may have made the immoral asset look
excessively aversive, thus enhancing, in people’s minds,
its negative moral value. Therefore, the comparison with a
neutral portfolio could have increased participants’ moral
awareness and their motivation to invest in a way that did
not require conceding their moral values.
In Study 3, we decided to test our hypotheses in a con-
text that should show in an even clearer way that the re-
duced disappointment depends on people’s desire to avoid
making tradeoffs between their moral values and more ma-
terial rewards, such as maximizing financial gains. In this
study, participants were simply asked to choose whether
they wanted to invest or not in a specific portfolio. If the
results of Study 2 did not depend on the specific compar-
isons available, we should replicate the results even when
participants are asked to consider only one portfolio.
4.1 Method
Participants. Two hundred fifty-two participants (39%
female; mean age 29 years, SD = 9.45) took part in Study
3. They were contacted on Amazon Mechanical Turk and
paid $0.15. People who participated in previous studies
on the same subject were filtered using TurkGate (Goldin
& Darlow, 2013). Participants were randomly assigned
to one of the three experimental conditions: eighty-five
participants completed the immoral condition; eighty-two
participants completed the neutral condition; and eighty-
five participants completed the moral condition.
Materials and procedure. Participants were presented
with the following scenario (immoral/neutral industrial
sectors in parenthesis):
Imagine you want to invest $10,000 in the stock market.
Among the many different alternatives you have looked
at, you have found a portfolio which invest in the stock
of two companies that belong to the microcredit (vivisec-
tion/airlines) industrial sector. Would you like to invest in
this portfolio?
As in Study 2, participants were provided with a defi-
nition of the industrial sector in which was investing the
portfolio they were presented with. In each condition, af-
ter reading the scenario, participants decided whether or
not they wanted to invest. In a subsequent screen, they
rated the motivation driving their decision and then, in
another screen, their disappointment upon learning that a
different decision would have yielded a better economic
outcome. In the last screen, participants rated the moral
value of the industrial sector in which the portfolio was
invested. Motivation, disappointment, and moral value
questions were the same as in Study 2.
4.2 Results
Preliminary analyses and choices. Ratings of moral
value for each industrial sector were analyzed by way of
an analysis of variance with condition (immoral, neutral,
moral) as the independent variable. Results revealed a sig-
nificant effect of condition, F (2, 251) = 84.23; p < .01;
η
2 = .40. Contrast effects, showed that the airline sector
(M = .38; SD = 1.11) fell in between the other two, and
was rated significantly different from both: respectively, t
(249) = 9.08; p < .01 for the comparison with vivisection
(M = − 1.36; SD = 1.38), and t (249) = 3.36; p < .01 for
the comparison with microcredit (M = 1.02; SD = 1.22).
In the immoral condition, 24% (N = 20) of participants
chose to invest in the portfolio composed of two vivisec-
tion companies. In the neutral condition, 40% (N = 33) of
participants decided to invest. Finally, in the moral con-
dition, 67% (N = 57) of participants decided to invest in
the portfolio composed of two companies involved with
microcredit. Results showed a significant difference be-
tween conditions, χ2 (2, 252) = 33.31; p < .01. Signifi-
cantly more people chose to invest in the moral condition
than in the neutral condition, χ2 (1, 167) = 12.08; p < .01,
whereas significantly less people decided to invest in the
immoral condition than in the neutral one, χ2 (1, 167) =
5.38; p = .02. Again, motivation ratings correlated posi-
tively with disappointment ratings, r = .51, p < .01.
Motivation ratings. To investigate the motivation driv-
ing participants’ decisions in the three conditions, we ran
a 3 (condition: immoral, neutral, moral) x 2 (choice: in-
vest, do not invest) analysis of variance. Results revealed
a significant effect of condition, F (2, 251) = 29.38; p <
.01; η2 = .19, and a significant effect of choice, F (1, 251)
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Figure 3: Average motivation ratings in Study 3 by
condition and investment choice. Lower values indicate
a stronger motivation to be true to ones’ moral values;
higher values indicate a stronger motivation to gain money
(scale ranging from −4 to +4).
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= 12.21; p < .01; η2 = .05. We also found a significant in-
teraction effect between choice and condition, F (2, 251)
= 21.21; p < .01; η2 = .15 (see Figure 3).
Contrasts showed that the immoral condition was the
only one in which the motivation of participants who in-
vested and those who did not were different. Participants
who did not invest in the immoral portfolio (M = −2.34;
SD = 2.32) reported being significantly more interested in
being true to their moral values than those who invested
(M = 1.50; SD = 1.85), t (246) = 7.89; p < .01. Further,
participants who did not invest in the immoral condition
were more motivated by being true to their moral values
compared with participants who decided to invest in the
moral portfolio (M = .33; SD = 2.06), t (246) = 7.50; p <
.01.
Disappointment ratings. A 3 (condition: immoral,
neutral, moral) x 2 (choice: invest, do not invest) analy-
sis of variance with disappointment ratings as the depen-
dent variable revealed a significant effect of condition, F
(2, 251) = 10.46; p < .01; η2 = .08, and a marginally sig-
nificant effect of choice, F (1, 251) = 3.53; p = .06; η2 =
.01. Further, we found a significant interaction between
condition and choice, F (2, 251) = 7.16; p < .01; η2 = .06
(see Figure 4).
The immoral condition was the only one in which peo-
ple who invested (M = 2.85; SD = 1.39) and those who
did not invest (M = 1.43; SD = 1.66) reported significantly
Figure 4: Average disappointment ratings in Study 3 by
condition and investment choice. Higher values indicate a
more intense disappointment (scale ranging from 0 to 5).
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different disappointment ratings, t (246) = 3.51; p < .01,
whereas in the moral condition, the difference was only
marginally significant (M = 3.00; SD = 1.52 for partic-
ipants who did not invest and M = 2.37; SD = 1.61 for
participants who invested), t (246) = 1.73; p < .09. Partic-
ipants who did not invest in the immoral asset felt signif-
icantly less disappointment when informed about the un-
satisfactory financial result than participants who invested
in the moral asset, t (246) = 3.27; p < .01.
4.3 Discussion
Study 3 supported again the hypothesis that people are
feeling less disappointment when investment decisions are
motivated by the desire to be true to their moral values than
when the motivation is to gain money. In this case, we
replicated the findings of the previous studies in a condi-
tion of separate evaluation in which participants could not
compare several portfolios with different levels of moral-
ity. Therefore, we showed that it is not just the presence of
less unethical alternatives that makes investors especially
sensitive to the moral dimension of an asset.
5 Study 4
In Study 4, the goal was to control for some additional
confounding factors that may have influenced the findings
of the first three studies. For one thing, we always ma-
nipulated the moral value of the investments by using dif-
ferent industrial sectors. It is possible that the specific as-
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set in which moral and immoral portfolios were investing
had an effect on the motivation driving participants’ de-
cisions and the disappointment ratings. In addition, we
always presented participants with minimal information
about the portfolios, without specifying important finan-
cial data such as the expected return. It is possible that
people would be more willing to invest in the immoral
portfolio if they have more detailed financial information
that could help them set more precise expectations about
the future performance. Finally, it could be argued that we
were actually measuring participants’ regret rather than
their disappointment. Therefore, it could be useful to com-
pare ratings for both disappointment and regret. Study 4
was aimed at controlling for these confounding factors and
expected to replicate the earlier findings.
5.1 Method
Participants. Two hundred forty-four participants (44%
female; mean age 31 years, SD = 10.17) took part in Study
4. They were contacted on Amazon Mechanical Turk and
paid $0.20. People who participated in previous studies
on the same subject were filtered using TurkGate (Goldin
& Darlow, 2013). Participants were randomly assigned to
one of the two experimental conditions: one hundred three
participants completed the moral condition; one hundred
forty-one participants completed the immoral condition.
Materials and procedure. In Study 4, participants were
presented with the following scenario (wording for the im-
moral condition in parenthesis):
Imagine you want to invest $10,000 in the stock market.
Among the many different alternatives you have looked at,
you have found a portfolio of companies that belong to the
technology sector. The companies in which the portfolio is
investing are currently realizing a stream of new software
and internet services that look very promising and were
met by very positive reviews in the media.
These companies established their factories in Amer-
ica and have never outsourced the production of any of
their products. In addition, they have always been against
child labor and they are regarded as some of the com-
panies offering the best social and economical conditions
for their employees. (However, these companies have also
been criticized in the media because of their outsourcing
practices and for taking advantage of child labor in the
factories of their East-Asian contractors. Violations of the
workers basic human rights in the factories abroad have
been demonstrated several times already.)
Technical information about the portfolio:
• Mean stock value for the companies in which the
portfolio invests: $12.47
• Mean Beta: 0.90
• Expected return of the portfolio for the next 12
months: 5%
Would you like to invest in this portfolio?
Participants were asked to decide whether or not they
wanted to invest in the portfolio they were presented with.
Then, in a separate screen, they were asked to rate the mo-
tivation driving their investment decision (the scale was
the same as in previous studies) and also to provide an
estimate of the expected return of the portfolio. This ques-
tion was presented in order to test and control for the pos-
sibility that financial expectations varied as a function of
the moral nature of the fund, and these expectations, rather
than the moral value, account for the differences in moti-
vation and regret. In a subsequent screen, upon learning
that a different decision would have yielded a better eco-
nomic outcome, participants rated both their disappoint-
ment and their regret (in both cases the responses were
provided on a scale ranging from 1 to 5). Finally, partic-
ipants rated the moral value of the technological compa-
nies in which the portfolio was invested. In particular, this
question asked about the way these companies were man-
aging the production of their products (taking advantage of
outsourcing strategies or not) and the working conditions
of their employees.
5.2 Results
Preliminary analyses and choices. Ratings of moral
value were analyzed by way of t-test with condition (moral
vs. immoral) as the independent variable. Results revealed
a significant effect of condition (Mmoral = 2.01, SD = 1.29
versus Mimmoral = − 1.87, SD = 1.21), t (243) = 24.07; p
< .01. In the immoral condition, 36% (N = 51) of par-
ticipants chose to invest in the portfolio, whereas, in the
moral condition, 87% (N = 90) of participants decided to
invest (χ2 (1, 244) = 63.98; p < .01, for the difference). An
analysis of variance 2 (condition: moral vs. immoral) x 2
(choice: invest vs. do not invest) with the evaluation of the
1-year expected value as dependent variable showed only
a not-quite significant effect of choice (Minvest = 10.24, SD
= 19.24 versus Mnotinvest = 6.13, SD = 5.84), F (1, 243) =
5.04; p = .08; η2 = .01, whereas the effect of the condition
was not significant, F (1, 243) = .29; p = .59; η2 < .01. Fi-
nally, the interaction was not significant, F (1, 243) = .23;
p = .63; η2 < .01. Disappointment and regret ratings were
highly positively correlated, r = .72, p < .01, therefore they
were averaged together. This new disappointment variable
correlated positively with motivation, r = .45, p < .01.
Motivation ratings. To investigate the motivation driv-
ing participants’ decisions in the two conditions, we ran a
2 (condition: moral, immoral) x 2 (choice: invest, do not
invest) analysis of variance. Results revealed a significant
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Figure 5: Average motivation ratings in Study 4 by
condition and investment choice. Lower values indicate
a stronger motivation to be true to ones’ moral values;
higher values indicate a stronger motivation to gain money
(scale ranging from −4 to +4).
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effect of condition, F (1, 243) = 24.25; p < .01; η2 = .09,
and a significant effect of choice, F (1, 243) = 22.88; p
< .01; η2 = .09. In addition, we also found a significant
interaction effect between choice and condition, F (1 243)
= 105.42; p < .01; η2 = .31 (see Figure 5).
Participants who did not invest in the immoral portfo-
lio reported being the most interested in being true to their
moral values. Contrast effects showed that the difference
was significant for the comparison between participants
who did not invest in the immoral portfolio (M = −2.44;
SD = 1.94) and participants who invested in the immoral
asset (M = 2.57; SD = 1.47), t (240) = 17.27; p < .01. The
difference was also significant for the comparison with
participants who did not invest in the moral portfolio (M
= 2.62; SD = 2.10), t (240) = 8.19; p < .01. Finally, par-
ticipants who did not invest in the immoral portfolio were
also more interested in being true to their moral values
than participants who invested in the moral asset (M = .79;
SD = 2.12), t (240) = 10.67; p < .01. Adding participants’
estimates of the 1-year expected return of the portfolio as
a covariate did not change the results and the covariate had
no significant effect on the motivation driving investment
decisions (p = .86).
Disappointment ratings. A 2 (condition: immoral,
moral) x 2 (choice: invest, do not invest) analysis of vari-
ance with the combined disappointment measure as the de-
pendent variable revealed a significant effect of choice, F
(1, 243) = 10.61; p < .01; η2 = .04, and a significant inter-
Figure 6: Average disappointment and regret ratings
combined by condition and investment choice in Study
4. Higher values indicate a more intense disappointment
(scale ranging from 0 to 5).
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action between condition and choice, F (1, 243) = 6.44; p
< .02; η2 = .03. The effect of condition was not significant,
F (1,243) = 2.35; p = .13; η2 = .01 (see Figure 6).
Participants who did not invest in the immoral portfolio
reported the lowest disappointment (M = 1.84; SD = 1.35).
Contrast effects showed that the difference was significant
when comparing the disappointment ratings of these par-
ticipants with the disappointment of those who invested in
the immoral portfolio (M = 3.22; SD = 1.36), t (240) =
5.70; p < .01. A significant effect was also found when
comparing participants who did not invest in the immoral
portfolio and those who did not invest in the moral one (M
= 2.81; SD = 1.82), t (240) = 2.36; p < .02. Finally, there
was a significant effect even for the comparison with par-
ticipants who invested in the moral portfolio (M = 2.98;
SD = 1.33), t (240) = 5.54; p < .01. Adding participants’
estimates of the 1-year expected return of the portfolio as
a covariate did not change the results and the covariate had
no significant effect on participants’ disappointment (p =
.22).
5.3 Discussion
The results of Study 4 supported the hypothesis even in
a condition in which the portfolio was invested in the
same industry in both the moral and immoral conditions.
This means that the results found in the previous studies
were not influenced by the different sectors presented in
the moral and immoral conditions. Finally, the results of
Study 4 showed that the effect was replicated despite the
Judgment and Decision Making, Vol. 10, No. 1, January 2015 Moral investing 73
fact that in both conditions participants received the same
financial information (expected return), therefore showing
that the impact of the moral value of an asset goes beyond
the simple evaluation of the economic utility of the invest-
ment.
6 General discussion
The present paper had the main goal of empirically
demonstrating that investors are not exclusively interested
in obtaining high gains, although the outcome of invest-
ments is certainly important. Further, we expected to find
that people who are more motivated to be true to their
moral values should have experienced lower disappoint-
ment upon learning that a different investment decision
could have yield a better outcome.
In Study 1, we contrasted a moral portfolio invested in
companies involved with fair trade and an immoral portfo-
lio invested in companies involved with pornography, find-
ing that participants choosing the moral portfolio where
more likely to do so because they wanted to be true to
their moral values. In turn, these participants felt also
lower disappointment, therefore demonstrating that hav-
ing other motivations beyond the simple financial results
can help them to cope with unsatisfactory investment per-
formance. These results lend empirical support to Stat-
man’s (2004) model of utilitarian and expressive benefits
of investments and extended it by showing that the goal
pursued by an investor can influence the way financial out-
comes are evaluated. Therefore, not only the motivation
behind investment decisions is not exclusively driven by a
desire to achieve high returns, but the evaluation of the fi-
nancial performance is influenced by non-financial dimen-
sions, too.
In Study 2, we replicated our findings in a condition in
which moral and immoral assets were not directly com-
pared but were presented along with a (relatively) more
neutral asset. Subsequently, Study 3 lend support for our
hypothesis in a context in which the moral and immoral as-
sets were presented separately, that is without being com-
pared with any other asset. Both in Studies 2 and 3, par-
ticipants who did not invest in the immoral portfolio re-
ported being more interested in being true to their moral
values rather than maximizing the financial outcome, and
reported a lower disappointment upon learning that a dif-
ferent decision would have yielded a better economic out-
come. These findings support the results found in Study 1,
highlighting that people chose the moral outcome because
they wanted to be true to their moral value and did so to
avoid the immoral asset.
Finally, in Study 4, we replicated our findings even pre-
senting participants with the same industrial sector in both
the moral and immoral conditions and stating explicitly
the expected return of the portfolio. In this way, we were
able to show that the findings did not depend on the spe-
cific industrial sectors used in the moral and immoral con-
ditions in the previous three studies. Study 4 also demon-
strated that this effect is independent from investors’ in-
ferences about the expected return of moral and immoral
assets.
Nevertheless, unanswered questions remain for future
research. For instance, we always used the framing of
a forgone gain, since participants were informed that in
making a different choice they could have gained more
money. We obviously are aware of the strong impact that a
different framing used to report a financial outcome could
have on people’s judgments. Therefore, future research
should investigate whether the same results can be repli-
cated when investors are presented with actual losses. Fur-
thermore, it might be interesting to test whether investors
who care about being true to their moral values would
feel even happier when their investments achieve posi-
tive returns. In addition, we did not ask about disappoint-
ment/regret when the supposedly moral investment did not
achieve its moral goals, or when the moral or neutral in-
vestment was revealed to be corrupt.
A limit of the present work is that we used only hypo-
thetical scenarios. It would be interesting to test the same
hypotheses with real investment choices, since the invest-
ment decision was also very simple, and participants had
to choose between just a few portfolios, whereas in real
financial markets investors can choose from hundreds of
different investment alternatives. In addition, in Study 4,
we compared moral and immoral conditions in which the
financial information (e.g., expected return) was the same.
It would be interesting to test whether an investor would
be willing to avoid an immoral asset even when this alter-
native is characterized by a higher expected return or when
the moral asset is riskier. Survey studies can help provide
some answers to these questions. The success of best of
sector ethical funds shows that investors are willing to pay
higher transaction costs for the only benefit of investing in
a fund branded as socially responsible (Beal et al., 2005).
Still, we believe that more research pointed at answering
these questions is needed.
Another limit concerns our comparisons of the effect
of moral vs. neutral and immoral vs. neutral. Although
we generally found that immorality mattered more than
morality, we did not attempt to equate the degree of per-
ceived morality (vs. neutral) with the degree of perceived
immorality. It is possible, for example, that the immoral
investments were viewed as strongly immoral by everyone
while the moral ones were not seen as particularly superior
by some subjects.
Despite the aforementioned limits, the studies described
in this paper have an important applied value since the
lower disappointment felt by investors who stay true to
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their moral values can potentially exacerbate some invest-
ment mistakes. Previous work showed that people’s af-
fective reactions have a strong impact on their investment
decisions (Lucey & Dowling, 2005). For instance, pre-
senting returns in a larger numerical format (- 19%) in-
duced people to feel a more intense feeling of disappoint-
ment and to sell their investment more often compared to
a group of people who saw the same return reported using
a smaller numerical format (- 0.19; Rubaltelli, Rubichi,
Savadori, et al., 2005). Similarly, when non-financial mo-
tivations reduce the disappointment experienced by in-
vestors, their motivation to sell may be weakened lead-
ing them to hold on to a losing investment for too long,
thus increasing the disposition effect (Shefrin & Statman,
1985; Barberis & Xiong, 2009, 2012).
To sum up, the main contribution of the present work
was to demonstrate that people who decide to be true to
their moral values when investing in the stock market ex-
perience a lower disappointment than people whose main
motivation is to invest to get a financial benefit. These
results extend Statman’s (2004) model of utilitarian and
expressive benefits of investment by showing more pre-
cisely when a non-financial dimension of investments (in
our case the moral value of an asset) is incorporated in
the investors’ decision and when it influences their evalu-
ation of financial outcomes. Concern for the moral value
of one’s investment decisions can offer a different point of
view along which people can evaluate a financial outcome,
and offers a cushion that makes unsatisfactory returns feel
less disappointing.
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